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Expeditionary Strike Group:  Command Structure Design Support* 
 
Susan G. Hutchins,1 William G. Kemple,1 David L. Kleinman,1 and Susan P. Hocevar2 
1Information Sciences Department 
2Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School, 589 Dyer Road, Monterey, CA  93943 




An Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) is a new capability mix that combines the 
combat power of three surface combatants and one submarine with an Amphibious 
Readiness Group/ Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) 
(ARG/MEU(SOC)). ESGs provide Combatant Commanders with more flexible, 
robust, and distributed offensive combat capability and enhance Naval expeditionary 
force survivability. Beginning in 2002, the Navy and Marine Corps began an 
experiment to explore the offensive and defensive capabilities of the ESG as well as 
different command structure options. This paper describes the initial effort by the 
Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control research program to support the 
analysis and design of ESG-1 command structures through modeling and analysis. 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The Chief of Naval Operations’ Global Concept of Operations requires a fleet of approximately 
375 ships that will increase the U.S. Navy’s striking power from today’s 12 Carrier Battle 
Groups (CVBGs), to 12 Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs), 12 Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs), 
multiple missile-defense Surface Action Groups (SAGs), and guided-missile submarines.  These 
groups will operate independently around the world to counter transnational threats and they will 
join together to form Expeditionary Strike Forces — the “gold standard” of naval power — when 
engaged in regional conflict.  
 
This dispersed, netted, and operationally agile fleet, operating as part of the Joint Force, will 
deliver the combat power needed to sustain homeland defense, provide forward deterrence in 
four theaters, swiftly deter two aggressors at the same time, and deliver decisive victory in one of 
those conflicts.  The Global Concept of Operations is designed to increase striking power, 
enhance flexibility, and provide more flexible, robust, and distributed offensive combat 
capability by transforming Amphibious Readiness Group/ Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special 
Operations Capable) ARG/MEUs into ESGs. 
 
An ESG is a new US Navy task force that integrates amphibious warships and Marines with a 
tomahawk missile-capable cruiser and destroyer, a frigate and fast-attack submarine. ESGs 
enhance Naval expeditionary force survivability by transforming a previously vulnerable, yet 
highly valuable, asset into a more combat credible force package (ESG OPS 2005).  This 
increased combat capability includes a variety of assets to conduct ISR, Strike and Naval Fire 
Support, Air Warfare, ASW/Surface Warfare, Maritime Interdiction Operations, and Tactical 
Ballistic Missile Defense.   
                                                 
* Funding for this research was received from the Cognitive and Neural Science Technology Division of ONR.  
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Beginning in 2002, the Navy and Marine Corps began an experiment to explore the offensive 
and defensive capabilities of the ESG as well as different command structure options. 
Advantages offered by ESGs include better distribution of global power, enhanced combat 
capability, and improved technologies and efficiencies for conducting the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT). The combination of three Cruiser-Destroyer (CRUDES) ships, a submarine, and a 
ARG/MEU(SOC) to form an ESG increases the offensive and defensive capabilities of the 
group. Core capabilities provided by ESGs include: (1) Power projection, (2) Maritime 
superiority for air, surface and subsurface, (3) Maritime special operations, (4) Amphibious 
operations, (5) Military operations other than war, (6) Enabling operations, (7) Supporting 
operations, and (8) serving as a Joint Task Force enabler.  
 
This new expeditionary strike force (ESF) concept is a key component of planning for future 
U.S. military capabilities.  Naval expeditionary force capabilities provide quick reaction to 
hostilities, providing humanitarian aid, power projection, and logistical support to forces ashore, 
in addition to supporting other types of operations.  In this new concept, the focus has shifted 
from placement of ships in the formation to deciding on what capabilities are needed and looking 
across the spectrum of available assets to decide which assets to bring to bear (Deal, Geis, & 
Goetke, 2003.)  Flexible, novel use of assets and “thinking out of the box” are emphasized when 
deciding on the placement of assets and ships (US Fleet Forces Command, 2002). 
 
1.1 Historical Perspective  
 
Because of their deployed nature, Naval Forces are frequently the first on-scene US forces 
capable of providing a quick reaction against a hostile country, and often conduct the “first 
strike” against a hostile country.  Follow-on forces, such as additional Carrier Strike Groups 
(CSGs), ESGs, amphibious forces, dedicated mine warfare forces, maritime pre-positioning 
forces, and combat logistics forces flow into the area of operations (AOR) to sustain operations 
over extended periods. (US Fleet Forces Command, 2002).  As additional forces arrive, the 
logistical burden and cost of operations increase.  Expeditionary naval forces eliminate some of 
the logistical burden associated with follow-on forces:  Maritime pre-positioning forces are an 
excellent example.  Moreover, Naval forces, through presence, enhance regional stability and 
provide alternatives as diplomatic negotiations are conducted to restore regional stability. 
 
1.2  What is an Expeditionary Strike Group? 
 
As stated above, an ESG combines an ARG/MEU(SOC) with the combat power of surface and 
submarine combatants. Amphibious landing ships transport troops, vehicles, and supplies wherever 
they are needed and provide great flexibility to commanders in planning operations.  However, 
amphibious ships are not designed for fighting hostile naval forces, especially highly 
maneuverable patrol craft found in coastal environments. Moreover, traditional ARG/MEU(SOC) 
deployments had no capability to provide naval surface fire support (NSFS) for Marines ashore or 
to strike targets at sea.  In order to counter littoral threats, the Navy has transformed ARGs into 
ESGs by assigning dedicated combatant ships—cruisers, destroyers, and frigates—to protect the 
amphibious ships.  ESGs are now able to provide NSFS and tactical land attack missile (TLAM) 
strikes in support of Marines ashore.   
 4
An ESG is a scalable, adaptable force, capable of planning and executing rapid strike and combat 
operations while operating in a limited non-permissive (i.e., low threat) environment.  ESGs 
combine a highly mobile group of platforms with a lean command and authority structure.  This 
rapid response is enabled by the capability to rapidly coordinate, deploy, and move to locations 
where they are needed.  In addition, ESGs are designed to be self-sustaining, as well as capable 
of autonomous action based on being comprised of a diverse set of capabilities.  A wide range of 
missions can be supported, from amphibious assault to disaster relief, based on the composition 
of integrated Navy and Marine Corps forces.  Structural adaptability, a unique and key 
characteristic, is an inherent characteristic of the ESG.  One aspect of this adaptable structure 
entails activating alternate warfare commanders in order to distribute workload.  Lateral 
collaboration is employed as an enabler of structural adaptability with a reliance on non-
traditional communication and coordination.   
 
1.3  Increased Capability   
 
The first ESG-1 deployed in 2003; the ships and commands that deployed with ESG-1 are listed 
in table 1.  Commander ESG-1 viewed the ESG as the maritime component for the Global War 
on Terrorism (GWOT), and the flag-led staff provided the combatant commander with:  (1) a 
subordinate staff capable of planning at the operational level; (2) the capability to task organize, 
which included taking command of inorganic forces as required; and (3) a single source 
commander capable of providing maritime and land force (US Fleet Forces Command, 2002).  
ESG 2 deployed in 2004 from the East coast, and parts are still overseas. The two deployments 
were similar in terms of ship and aircraft composition, but different in ESG organizational 
structures and command relationships (Deal, Cornforth, Goetke, and Parcell, 2004).  The group 
composition of both pilot deployments increased the group’s offensive and defensive 
capabilities. 
 






  COMEXSTRIKGRU One   USS Peleliu 
  13th MEU(SOC)   USS Ogden 
  COMPHIBRON Three   USS Germantown 
  TACRON-11 Detachment 4   USS Port Royal 
  BMU-1 Detachment C   USS Decatur 
  ACU-5 Detachment C   USS Jarret 
  ACU-1 Detachment E   USS Greenville 
  EODMU-3 Detachment   
  Fleet Surgical Team 5  
  Fleet Info Warfare Center Detachment  
  HC-11 Detachment 9  
  HSL-37 Detachment 1  






1.4 ESG Missions 
 
The ESG can be used to support a combatant commander in larger contingencies as part of an 
ESF or it can provide the core capability to form a Joint Task Force for smaller, operational-level 
missions.  The current ESG-1’s mission is to, “provide the Combatant Commander or Fleet 
Commander a versatile sea-based operational force that can be tailored to a variety of missions, 
including quick reaction crisis response options in maritime, littoral, and inland environs in 
support of U.S. Policy.  The ESG is capable of executing all ARG/MEU(SOC) missions and 
additional offensive and defensive operations in a limited non-permissive environment.” 
(EWTGPAC, 2005) 
 
Eight core capabilities are provided by ESGs:  Power projection, maritime superiority (air, 
surface, and subsurface), maritime special operations, amphibious operations, military operations 
other than war, enabling operations, supporting operations, and Joint Task Force (JTF) enabler.  
Table 2 presents a list of the integrated essential tasks that are conducted by an ESG.  Table 3 
presents the capabilities specifically performed by the MEU.   
 
Table 2.  Integrated Mission Essential Tasks Conducted by an Expeditionary Strike Group 
 
 
Both USN and USMC 
 
 Conduct Intelligence, Surveillance and  
 Reconnaissance 
 Conduct Amphibious Assault 
 Conduct Information Operations/ Warfare  Conduct Amphibious Withdrawal 
 Tactical Deception Operations  Conduct Amphibious Demonstration 
 Provide Operational Fires (Joint/ Coalition)  Conduct NEO 
 Provide Anti-Terrorism/ Force Protection  Conduct Humanitarian/ Disaster Assist 
 Conduct Terminal Guidance Operations  Conduct Peace Operations 
 Conduct MIO/ EMIO Operations  Conduct Deliberate Planning 
 Conduct ESG Force Defense  
 (AD/USW/SUW/DAF) 
Provide Contingency Support Packages (TRAP, 
 CASEVAC, QRF, MASS, CASUALTY)  
 Conduct VBSS (compliant/ non-compliant)  USMC Specific 
    
 Conduct Sustainment Operations  Conduct Amphibious Raid 
 Provide Command, Control, Communications  
 and Computers 
 Conduct Direct Action Operations  
 (Precision  Raid or VBSS) 
 Conduct Initial Terminal Guidance Operations  Conduct Airfield/ Port Seizure 
 
USN Specific 
   
 Conduct Security Operations 
 Provide Theatre Missile Defense Warning  Conduct Limited Expeditionary Airfield Op’s 
 Provide Sea Lines of Communications Protection  Employ Non-Lethal Weapons 
 Provide Sanctions Enforcement  Conduct Enhanced Urban Operations 
 Deploy/ Conduct Operational Maneuver  
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Table 3.  Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Capabilities 
 
 





  Amphibious Assault 
  Amphibious Raid 
  Amphibious Demonstration 
  Amphibious Withdrawal 
 
Direct Action Operations 
 
  Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities 
  Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Operations (VBSS) 
  Specialized Demolition Operations 
  Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) 
  Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel or Material 
  Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) 
 
  Peace Operations 
           -  Peacekeeping 
           -  Peace Enforcement 
  Security Operations 
  Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) 
  Reinforcement Operations 
  Joint/Combined Training/ Instruction Team 




  Tactical Deception Operations 
  Fire Support Planning, Coordination and Control in a Joint/ Combined Environment 
  Signal Intelligence/ Electronic Warfare 
  Military Operations in Urban Terrain 
  Reconnaissance and Surveillance 
  Initial Terminal Guidance 
  Counterintelligence Operations  
  Airfield/ Port Seizure 
  Limited Expeditionary Airfield Operations 
  Show of Force Operations 
  Joint Task Force Enabling Operations 
  Shipping Operations 
 
1.4.1  “Plug and Play” 
 
Among other requirements, ESG-1 must be able t work smoothly while planning and conducting 
these missions in several contexts.  Two issues are of particular interest to this study.  ESG-1 as a 
“unit of force” under a senior Naval Commander such as a Joint Force Maritime Component 
Commander (JFMCC), Fleet commander, or Amphibious Force Commander requiring coordina-
tion with N-staff/CWC Doctrine and possibly Joint Amphibious Doctrine. Or, as part of a Joint 
Force, working directly for the Joint Force Commander.  This latter case could range from a 
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small JTF with its own AOR to a context that requires significantly more coordination with the 
JFACC, JFLCC, JFMCC, and JSOTF.  In this case Joint Doctrine is applicable, including Joint 
Amphibious Doctrine.  While the set of possible missions remains constant across contexts, it is 
assumed that the mix and frequency of mission types will change.  Equally, or more important, 
the C2 agencies with which the ESG will need to interoperate, and their underlying doctrine will 
change. For example, coalition ships may join the ESG for various missions. 
 
1.4.2   Dispersed Operations and Attachments 
 
Based on past ESG deployments, ESG-1 can anticipate creating Expeditionary Action Groups 
(EAGs), where two or more ships for the EAG are typically deployed (e.g., to put Marines 
ashore) to some location outside the immediate battlespace, along with supporting air assets.  A 
supported commander is designated for each EAG.  The fact that ESG assets are likely to be 
dispersed geographically, as EAGs or otherwise, has led people to question whether a CWC-like 
organization is best.  Typically, CWC requires a close proximity of all warfare commanders for 
planning, asset apportionment, and task execution.  At the same tie, ESG-1 can anticipate 
detaching assets to support other commanders and assuming control of additional assets from 
coalition partners, the Coast Guard, the nay, etc.  
 
1.5  Organizational Structure and Command Relationships 
 
The East coast ESG is organized around an existing ARG/MEU(SOC) with the PHIBRON and 
MEU(SOC) commanders typically operating  in a “support relationship.” Selected subject matter 
experts (SMEs) will augment the PHIBRON staff to facilitate planning and operations of the 
additional capabilities the surface combatants, submarine and other designated forces bring to the 
ESG. The West coast deployment established an ESG Staff, separate from the existing 
PHIBRON and ARG/MEU(SOC) staffs, which functions as the officer in tactical command 
(OTC). The ESG construct establishes a baseline staff and “pulls additional staff” from the 
existing ARG/MEU(SOC) staff and subordinate forces (Deal, Cornforth, Goetke, and Parcell, 
2004).  
 
2.  Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control (A2C2) 
 
The Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control (A2C2) research program, sponsored by 
the Office of Naval Research, for the past eight years has focused on helping to define adaptive 
command structures for future joint and combined forces.  Early research involved working with 
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Strategic Studies Group (SSG) XVIII to help define 
adaptive command structures for what will become Sea Power XXI. Next, the A2C2 team worked 
with Commander Carrier Group One (COMCARGRUONE), ADM Polatty’s staff, to conduct a 
one-week experiment with model-driven alternative command structures in preparation for Global 
Wargame 1999 (Levchuk, Kleinman, Pattipati, Kemple, & Luoma, 2000; Hess, Entin, Hess, 
Hutchins, Kemple, Kleinman, Hocevar, & Serfaty 2000).   
 
In 2001, A2C2 team members conducted a series of quantitative modeling and simulation 
analyses to support the SSG XXI Cognitive Concept Generation Team. The goal was to align the 
Navy’s tactical C2 organization and processes with the FORCEnet concept.  Results highlighted 
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the superiority of FORCEnet structures over Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) structures 
for future missions.  Modeling and simulation results indicate that the FORCEnet C2 
organizational structure has the potential to increase speed of command (over today’s CWC 
structure) through more efficient use of resources, and, through increased collaboration, to 
improve the warfighter’s shared awareness of the situation and of the roles, responsibilities, and 
actions of other warfighters (Serfaty, MacMillan, Baker, Entin, Wetteland, Miller, Bowden, 
Laughery, Pattipati, Levchuk, Kemple, Carley, & Handley, 2002).  Based on this shared 
awareness, the research team predicts the FORCEnet structure will be more adaptable, thus 
better able to maintain performance as the situation and/or mission changes. 
 
2.1  A2C2 Current Work 
 
Our current research entails the use of A2C2 approaches for assessing ESG organizational 
constructs and structures.  The A2C2 research team is engaged in a program to support the 
analysis and design of ESG-1 command structures based on interactions with RADM LeFever, 
Expeditionary Warfare (N75), and BGEN Schmidle, USMC, Expeditionary Force Development 
Center. An adaptive C2 architecture for an ESG — referring to both structure and process — 
should be able to work smoothly in either of the following two contexts (for both planning and 
operations) and to shift between the two:   (1) As part of a Joint Force, working directly for the 
Joint Force Commander (e.g., operating as a theater reserve or operating as a small JTF).  This 
could occur anywhere on a continuum ranging from acting as a small JTF with its own area of 
responsibility to being in a more complex context that requires significantly more coordination 
with the Joint Force Air Component Commander, Joint Force Land Component Commander, and 
Joint Force Maritime Component Commander.  (2) As part of a larger Naval Force requiring 
coordination with its N-staff/CWC structure. 
 
2.2  Research Objectives   
 
The objectives for this A2C2 research effort include the following two goals: (a) model the 
current organizational architecture and C2 processes of ESG-1 and identify possible deficiencies 
and performance problems that are due to structural, organizational and behavioral causes; and 
(b) use the tools and techniques developed in the last few years by the Office of Naval Research-
sponsored A2C2 program to suggest and experimentally test organizational structures that are 
more congruent with the evolving mission of the ESG.  
 
The modeling effort will rely on a variation of the design-model-test-model method and will use 
an existing scenario that encapsulates key ESG missions.  A deign-model-test-model research 
paradigm has been used previously to generate and test candidate organizational architectures 
and empirically evaluate them in experiment with military officers at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, in Monterey (Hutchins, Kemple, Entin & Serfaty, 1998). Three levels of analysis that 
could be performed include: assessment, comparison, and optimization.   
 
Assessment might include analysis of the current ESG structure with a scenario across a range of 
measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. The goal for this level of analysis would 
be the diagnosis of problematic areas and suggestions for potential organizational remedies. 
Comparison would involve comparative modeling of the current structure vs. alternative 
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structures (alternative operational architectures) and a quantitative assessment of performance 
pay-offs. An optimization-based design and simulation of alternative architectures would focus 
on a quantitative assessment of performance pay-offs.  Depending on time available, any or all of 
these methods could be applied to specific C2 architectural requirements. Examples of some data 
requirements that would be needed to perform a mission-based modeling and simulation study of 
alternative organizational structures for ESG include:  
 
Assets: 
• Technical specs: velocity, weapons payload, range, resource capability (of each weapon  
and of asset), etc. 
• Missions and roles; ownership, utilization, unit cost 
• Relative asset-to-task score 
Mission: 
• CONOPS; Decomposition into mission tasks; predictions for unanticipated tasks 
• Desired contingency planning requirements 
• Task resource requirements, locations, precedence constraints, required asset package 
Communication: 
• Rules of communication – events, messages, roles of liaison teams 
• Communication constraints 
Control & asset allocation: 
• Asset ownership structure; overlap between platform and asset ownerships, and conflict  
resolution rules 
• Asset request rules and asset transfer rules 
• Control mechanism specs; asset-task allocation controller architectures and constraints 
Command structure: 
• Command methodology: command-generating cells and their rules/constraints 
• Command vs. asset ownership 
 
3  Command and Control Issues 
 
3.1  Multiple Missions 
 
Conducting multiple concurrent missions is an integral part of an ESG and these missions occur 
across the entire spectrum of operational missions.  A complicating factor is that ESGs are being 
tasked with many new missions where both the staff and forces are being split apart while 
conducting these different missions.  Additionally, in some cases the processes needed to 
conduct the mission have not yet been fully developed and personnel have not always had time 
to train for the new mission.   
 
An extremely intense planning cycle is needed to keep one-step ahead of all these concurrent 
missions and this can cause some friction when the operators are tied up for a potion of each day 
with planning. Another complicating factor is the scarcity of assets available to support 
conducting multiple missions, for example, operations occurring on both land and at sea that 
require the same air assets.  The requirement to perform multiple missions is creating situations 
where operators are performing new tasks, using new processes and, in some cases, using assets 
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in new ways.  In ESG-1, the Admiral is the final arbitrator for resource allocation and other 
issues that arise each day. 
 
3.1.1   A Busy Week in the Gulf.  Imagine the following scenario, which illustrates the range of 
missions conducted by an ESG. The overriding mission for ESG-1 was to protect the oil 
platforms in the Northern Arabian Gulf (NAG).  Protecting Iraqi oil platforms is a critical 
tasking, because an accident involving an oil platform would be a major environmental and 
economic disaster.  In addition, two companies of Marines were ashore in Iraq conducting 
humanitarian operations and associated information operations, while another company of 
Marines was being prepared to be dropped off on the southern Horn of Africa for several weeks 
for training.  At the same time, another group of Marines was planning to land in Iraq to conduct 
a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO). The Air Control Element (ACE), comprised of six 
CH-46s (Marine aircraft), were used to conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(ISR) in support of Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO).  Six AV-8Bs were sent off to the 
Coalition Operations Air Center (COAC) to conduct ISR and, in a separate operation, were sent 
to provide close air support.  Additional Marine Corps aircraft, aboard the LHA, were used in 
logistics support of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).  
 
During this same time period, Navy and Marines Corps personnel were involved, on a daily 
basis, in conducting multiple visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) of local shipping traffic, in 
the Arabian Gulf, to intercept illegal goods as part of the Global War on Terror.  The LHA, CG, 
and LSD were operating in the Northern Arabian Gulf, and additional assets — an Australian 
FFG and a German FFG — were sent to assist in protecting the oil platforms and high-value 
units.  The mission was to warn ships away from the oil platforms and to enforce United Nations 
sanctions on contraband oil.  This group of ships conducted approximately 25 queries per day 
and approximately 18 boardings per day (a combination of “compliant” and opposed boardings). 
These boat boardings were assisted by a Coast Guard cutter and two patrol craft (from 5th fleet).  
 
Additional ad hoc tasking included planning for boarding a dhow on short notice (~12 hours) and 
being prepared for an on-call Special Recovery mission by Special Operations Forces (SOF).  
Related tasks included conducting surveillance operations, dealing with pirates who were 
harassing small boats, and maintaining the air defense posture.  Implied tasks included care and 
protection of the detained ships and crew.  The LPD, FFG, and two HH-60s (from the carrier 
battle group) were en route to the Horn of Africa as part of an Expeditionary Action Group 
(EAG) to rendezvous with a submarine.  The DDG was working with 3rd Fleet as an anti-ballistic 
missile screen and a US Maritime Agency ship was performing underwater surveys in the local 
area, with ESG ships providing force protection for this ship.   
 
While all these missions are well-suited to the ESG’s capabilities, in some cases, the immediate 
nature of the tasking can stress the planning cycle as well as the allocation of assets required to 
conduct the mission.  Additionally, the ability of different people to perform their job becomes 
even more critical than in the past. As an example, when the air defense commander requests 
another warfare commander’s asset, synchronizing the use of these assets must occur seamlessly.  
In fact, the ESG found that it is important to have the warfare commanders co-located on the 
same ship because when they were distributed the communications overhead was too high to stay 
apprised of the situation.  One change being made to the USS Tarawa entails alteration of the 
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Joint Operations Center so the SCC can be present in this space in recognition of the importance 
of face-to-face communications to maintain situation awareness.   
  
4. ESG Research Issues 
 
It is assumed that the two contexts in which the ESG will operate would generate different mixes 
and frequencies of missions and tasks. A key question is, can the ESG-1 make the most efficient 
and effective use of its assets to address the varying mix of missions across these two organiza-
tional contexts while using a CWC (or current?) structure?  (Note: The C2 architecture includes 
ESG staff structure and doctrine, ESG organization structure/doctrine, and ESG C2 processes.)  
Related questions include the following.  
•  What are the structural and process inhibitors of efficient/effective:   
•  Use of assets?  
•  Coordination across warfare areas?  
•  Coordination with MEU and use of MEU assets?  
•  Coordination with externals (e.g., coalition, attached units, reach back, vertical, 
    and horizontal)?  
•  Asset allocation process?   
•  How does switching between contexts impact the effective use of assets?  
•  What can be done to mitigate inhibitors?  
•  What will contribute to necessary adaptability of C2 structures/processes? 
 
4.1  Flag Officer/General Officer 
 
A traditional ARG/MEU(SOC) deploys with two, co-equal 06 commanders, the CO of the 
MEU(SOC) and the commanding officer of the amphibious squadron (CPR), who share 
command. This relationship is based on the supported/supporting doctrine in Joint Doctrine for 
Amphibious Operations.  For many missions, a higher authority will designate the supported and 
supporting commanders (Deal, Cornforth, Goetke, and Parcell, 2004); in other cases, CPR and 
CO MEU will mutually agree upon the supported commander. This is the command model 
adopted by ESG-2. ESG-1 operated under a flag officer, with a separate staff, and the 
Commander, ESG-1 functioned as the officer in tactical command (OTC).    
 
One outstanding consideration is the question of whether the ESG should be led by a Flag level 
or General Officer vice an O-6 level officer. An ESG Flag-led staff provides the Coalition Force 
Maritime Component Commander a more experienced and senior Staff afloat. A Flag-led staff 
also bridges the operational and tactical levels and avoids task saturation at the CTG level. The 
Flag-led ESG is centered on looking ahead to transform littoral warfare doctrine and force 
structure.  Other advantages offered by a Flag-led ESG include: a Flag-led ESG is more effective 
when coordinating with Flag-led coalition Units; a Flag-led ESG achieves parity with a Carrier 
Strike Group — a significant advantage once in theater (and for procuring resources during work 
ups).  A Flag-led ESG is essential for conducting Regional Engagements, particularly in the 
CENTCOM area of operations. (ESG-3 Expeditionary Strike Group 3 Task Force 58 Post-
Deployment Brief, 11 January 05).  
 
4.2  Doctrine 
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The ESG currently uses a mixture of doctrines, combining Composite Warfare Commander1 
(CWC) doctrine and the supported/supporting relationship from Amphibious doctrine.2  In effect, 
this entails the Surface Combat Commander (SCC) being required to operate under two different 
sets of doctrine.  The SCC node can become extremely busy and the requirement for the OTC to 
manage two organizational structures adds to an already high workload.  Under CWC doctrine 
the SCC has authority for the apportionment of assets.  Yet when managing the MEU assets, the 
supported/supporting relationship is the prevailing doctrine and represents a very different way 
of apportioning assets.   
 
Issues that arise when employing a combined set of doctrine include the question of who is the 
supported commander and who is the supporting for different situations?  CWC doctrine is 
geared more for open ocean operations, yet those are not the type of missions envisioned for the 
ESG. A related issue is that CWC doctrine is defensive in nature, developed from the perspective 
of a “blue water” Navy defending the Fleet.  Strike capability was added later where the Navy 
version of strike was conducted by carrier aircraft.  Because Naval strike and amphibious strike 
involve different aspects, it can be confusing to have a “Strike Commander.” 
 
5.  The Current ESG-1 
 
The current ESG-1 is scheduled to deploy again sometime in Spring 2005, and will be headed by 
a Navy Admiral.  ESG-1 will consist of the USS Tarawa (LHA) as the primary flag ship, along 
with the USS Pearl Harbor (LSD) and USS Cleveland (LPD) as the other amphibious ships.  The 
surface combatants will include the USS Chosin (CG), USS Stout or Gonzales (DDG), USS 
Ingraham (FFG) plus an attached submarine, the Santa Fe (SSN).  The 13th MEU(SOC) is the 
major strike component of ESG-1 and consists of a “standard” Ground Combat Element (GCE) 
(a 2000-man Marine force comprised of three companies), an Air Combat Element (ACE), and 
the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE).  The ACE, which constitutes the major part of the 
air power of the ESG, consists of 6 Harriers (AV8B), 12 assault helicopters (CH-46), 4 Cobra 
helicopters (AH-1W), 3 Huey aircraft (UH-1) plus 4 heavy lift helicopters (CH-53). 
 
At present the Tarawa is undergoing reconfiguration of its key C2 spaces along with other ship 
upgrades.  The officers and staff are going through a series of training events and planned 
exercises in preparation for their final deployment.  The training (and to some extent the ship 
space reconfiguration) is commensurate with the C2 structure that has been chosen for ESG-1.  
This C2 structure for ESG-1 is shown in Figure 1. 
 
                                                 
1 CWC doctrine is geared more for open ocean operations, yet those are not the type of missions envisioned for the 
ESG. CWC doctrine is more appropriate when ships are operating in close proximity and can provide mutual 
support. 
2 Post World War II, the Marine Corps rewrote the traditional Amphibious Warfare doctrine and developed the 
supported/supporting commander concept which specifies which commander will be supported and which will 
support, the conduct of each mission.  This precludes, for example, a Navy Warfare commander from taking 

































Figure 1.  Proposed Command and Control Structure for ESG-1. 
 
The C2 structure for ESG-1 is similar to that used in ESG-3 (although the people that filled the 
commander roles differ).  The five principal warfare commanders include:  Sea Combat 
Commander (SCC), Air Defense Commander (ADC), Strike Warfare Commander (STWC), 
Information Warfare Commander (IWC), and SOF Warfare Commander (SOFWC).  It may be 
assumed that these commanders fall under a Navy-like CWC doctrine, with the possible 
exception of the SOFWC. 
 
4.1  The CWC-like relationships in ESG-1 
 
When assigning these principal roles to individual commanders, factors such as expertise, staff 
size and capability, conflict resolution authority, and so on need be taken into account.  Unlike 
some previous ESGs, the role of Strike Commander may not be allocated to the MEU 
commander, but is retained by CESG-1.  Presumed advantages of this decision include the ability 
to better coordinate Navy strike with MEU ground strike (providing unity of command), keeping 
a focal point for resolving the competing demands from other warfare commanders (WCs) for 
the ACE air assets, and removing/reducing the operational constraints on MEU assets.  
 
Clearly this is a controversial decision as the battalion landing team (BLT) is the major strike 
force in the ESG, and the primary mission for the ACE is to support the Marines on the ground.  
However, in previous ESG deployments, upon entering theater and becoming a unit of force 
under a JTF or a Fleet Commander, the Marines were often detached ashore (sometimes with 
only a part of their ACE), or part of the ACE (e.g., the AV8Bs) were sent off (i.e., the tactical 
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control (TACON) was transferred) to a regional commander for assignment elsewhere.  It is felt 
that the flexibility to deal with such external demands on MEU strike assets is best left to the 
CESG and his N-staff. 
 
The role of IWC is retained by the CESG, or more precisely his N3 (current Operations Officer) 
or possibly his N2 (Intel officer).  The PHIBRON (CPR) has been given the hat of SCC, and the 
captain of the CG has the role of ADC.  Note that the ADC role deals largely with the employ-
ment of air defense systems (missiles, guns) and maneuver of the ESG ships.  However, when 
conducting air defense, the ADC will often call upon, or seek available air assets, to conduct 
visual identification of suspect aircraft in a vital zone.  At this time it is not clear whether ESG-1 
will have SOF or NSW teams attached when it reaches theater, and consequently no individual 
has yet been assigned as the SOFWC, although a member of the ESG staff (e.g., the N5) could 
take on this role. 
 
There are several Functional Warfare area commanders under the SCC.  These include Undersea 
Warfare (USWC), Surface Warfare (ASUWC), Screen (SC), Mine Warfare (MIWC), and 
Maritime Interdiction Operations Commanders (MIOC).  These roles are not necessarily filled 
by individuals on a standing basis, but are “stood-up” as the situation warrants, for example if 
workload in a functional area becomes excessive.  In ESG-1, individuals are identified as 
secondary Functional Warfare commanders, with the SCC (and his staff!) being the primary 
commander(s).  Note that it is also possible to designate a secondary SCC, for example by 
dividing the SCC duties across the battlespace in a geographic manner.   
 
The various Functional Warfare commanders (if and when they are activated) will continue to 
report to the CPR/PHIBRON as the SCC.  They do not become “equals” to the principal warfare 
commanders who operate under a CWC-like doctrine.  The reason for this is to avoid subordinate 
conflict over the apportionment of scarce Navy air assets.  There are only four SH-60s, plus 
possibly one or two attached HH-60s, that must be allocated for ASW, ASUW, MIOC, plus 
continual surveillance and tracking and ISR. 
 
The missions that will be conducted under the SCC in the present ESG-1 structure are both 
defensive (ASW, ASUW) and offensive (MIO) in nature.  In the previous ESG-3 the defensive 
activities were assigned to the captain of the CG, who wore the hat of SCC.  The CPR retained 
the offensive role as the MIOC and was also the MIWC.  (Given the advances and new systems 
coming on line for mine operations, there are some who believe that the role of MIWC should be 
kept separate and unique from SCC.)  The fact that the CPR is tasked with such a broad spectrum 
of duties/missions is requiring that additional personnel and capabilities be added to the CPR 
staff. 
 
4.2  The Supported-Supporting Relationships in ESG-1 
 
The CPR/PHIBRON and the MEU Commander are the two primary force providers to the ESG.  
(The SOFWC is a third.)  Under amphibious doctrine these two individuals operated in a 
supporting-supported relationship where the focus was to bring Marines ashore.  Thus, the 
PHIBRON was the Commander of the Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and the MEU-CO was 
the Commander of the Landing Force (CLF).  The PHIBRON had operational control (OPCON) 
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of the amphibious ships (LHA, LSD, LPD), whereas the MEU-CO had OPCON of the BLT and 
ACE.  In ESG-1, as in previous ESGs, the supporting-supported relationships articulated under 
amphibious doctrine are retained between CPR and MEU-CO.  
 
It has been stated that in the previous deployment of ESG-1, the N-staff (along with other key 
personnel) did the planning for various missions, and the force providers did the execution.  It is 
expected that a similar mode of operation will be found in the current ESG-1.  If so, each mission 
being conducted is assigned a supported commander, along with one or more supporting 
commanders.  The use of assets is planned in advance depending on the time-criticality of the 
mission.  (Air planning is typically conducted with a 48-72 hour lead time in order to provide 
input to the regional air tasking order (ATO)). An area in which the supporting-supported 
relationships manifest is the creation of Expeditionary Action Groups (EAGs).  In such cases, 
two or more ships for the ESG are typically dispersed (e.g., to put Marines ashore at some 
location outside the immediate battlespace area), along with some supporting air assets.   
 
A supported commander will be designated for each EAG.  The use of Maritime Special Purpose 
Forces (MSPF), a small highly capable Marine unit, will also fall under a supporting-supported 
relationship.  Depending on the mission, the designated MSPF commander might be supported 
(e.g. when tasked to do a heliborne-visit, board, search, and seizure (H-VBSS), or might be 
supporting to a maritime interdiction operation commander (MIOC) by performing ISR on 
departing ships from an inserted ground position.  Clearly, the designation of a supported 
commander (and associated supporting commanders) on a mission-by-mission basis suggests a 
highly flexible C2 organization.  Indeed, one might even argue that the C2 organization is 
“different” depending on the mission.  The fact that ESG assets are likely to be dispersed 
geographically, as an EAG or otherwise, has led people to question whether a CWC-like 
organization is best for dispersed operations.  Typically, CWC requires a close proximity of all 
WCs for planning, asset apportionment, and task execution. 
 
A final element shown in Figure 1 is the Tactical Air Squadron (TACRON).  This unit, which is 
attached to ESG, conducts the air planning, develops the ATO for ESG air, manages air traffic, 
etc.  The TACRON is a key participant in the ESG planning meetings.  In at least one previous 
ESG, the TACRON assumed the role of STWC (once the MEU had been offloaded).  The 
TACRON generally assumes the central role for all ESG air operations, and is also the AREC 
and helicopter element coordinator (HEC). 
 
4.3 Other Elements that Affect the C2 Organization 
 
In addition to the primary warfare commanders and the functional commanders, the C2 organiza-
tion includes approximately eight to ten “coordinators” that make the C2 processes work.  These 
people are the enablers, and their roles and responsibilities are generally established by the 
armed forces well outside of the ESG.  Some examples of these warfare coordinators are the 
Submarine Element (SEC), Helicopter Element (HEC), Force Track (FTC), Launch Area (LAC), 
etc.  In addition to these coordinators, a C2 organization relies heavily on the use of Liaison 
Officers (LNOs) to effect coordination and provide expertise between C2 nodes.  The use of 
LNOs is particularly useful for planning operations when forces in question are dispersed. 
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The backbone of any C2 organization is the C2 systems that support information distribution, 
presentation, command briefs, teleconferencing, communications, and coordination.  These are 
the hardware and software systems, the data collection systems, and display systems.  It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to discuss them here, but we note that as reported from Tactical Training 
Group, Pacific (TTGP), the relative use and utility of C2 systems listed in increasing order of 
effectiveness was: Collaboration at Sea (CAS) – Knowledge Web (KWeb) – CENTRIX – Global 
Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-M) – Advanced Combat Display System 
(ACDS) – email – chat – voice.  It is well known that email, chat and voice predominate in Joint 
operations, however due to the secure nature of these media, CENTRIX is the C2 system that is 
used for coordination with coalition forces.  
 
The battle rhythm of an ESG describes the daily activity cycle of commanders and staff, and is 
depicted in Figure 2.  It encompasses future operations, current operations, the development of 
commander’s intent, and “effects” within an EBO.  While the battle rhythm is not a part of the 
C2 organization per se, it has relevance to the C2 processes.  The planning and monitoring 
processes (including meetings and preparations), along with the promulgation of effects, place 
concurrent demands on the key warfare commanders and their staff.  For example, an ESG may 
be planning two missions while they are executing three!  Moreover, the internal planning within 
the ESG must synchronize with external processes ongoing in theater such as a regional ATO 
(via JFACC), or the planning being done by a Naval Fleet or Carrier Strike Group (CSG). 
 
4.4 Some Comments on the Proposed C2 Organization for ESG-1 
 
As mentioned earlier, the C2 roles established in ESG-1 are similar in large part to those of 
earlier ESGs.  In particular, earlier ESGs employed a mix of CWC and amphibious doctrine.  
The careful articulation of supported-supporting relationships was a key contributor to the 





Figure 2.  Typical Battle Rhythm of an ESG. 
 
As noted earlier, the ESG has two major force providers (CPR and MEU), and three staffs of 
various sizes and expertise (C-ESG, CPR, and MEU) to conduct a myriad of missions.  There is 
clearly overlap in staff expertise (e.g. air, especially when one adds the TACRON).  And there 
are gaps in staff expertise (e.g., MIO/VBSS) due in large part to new mission requirements 
arising from GWOT. 
 
Clearly, the CPR/PHIBRON is a major node in the C2 structure of ESG-1.  Not only is this 
person a force provider (having OPCON or TACON over the amphibious ships, the surface 
combatants and the SSN), but he is also a key player (SCC) within a CWC-like structure, and is 
fulfilling his “usual” role as the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) for Marine 
operations ashore and operating therein in a supported-supporting relationship.  [It is noted that 
in ESG-3 the title of Amphibious Warfare Commander (AWC) was given to the Navy’s role of 
supporting the MEU.]  Even the SCC role is a mix of defensive and offensive duties.  ESG-1, in 
recognizing the potential overload to the CPR, is attempting to increase the CPR staff and has 
designated alternate (functional) warfare commanders that could be activated as needed.  In 
addition, in recognition of the central role of the CPR, the workspace in the JOC on board the 
Tarawa is being enlarged to accommodate the CPR and additional staff. 
 
The multiple hats being worn by the CPR has led other ESGs to consider a “decomposition” of 























































Whether the CPR (and staff) are overloaded or pulled in different directions as a consequence of 
operating under two different doctrines, and whether the activation of subordinate commanders 
upon demand will prove effective in times of stress remain to be tested.  Nevertheless, the role of 
the CPR in future ESG C2 organizations will be one of much discussion.  To quote from ADM 
Conway (CESG-1): “I don’t think a PHIBRON is applicable anymore.  We need to combine 
PHIBRONs and Destroyer Squadrons (DESRONs) and take their planning and operating 
strengths, and use the seniority to be able to work with other warfare commanders.” 
 
The limited air assets of the ESG, which consists primarily of the ACE augmented by a few 
Navy helicopters and possibly some attached forces, is expected to be under high demand from 
several warfare areas.  To help alleviate requests for a specific air asset, the training regimen for 
ESG-1 is stressing “adaptation” and creative use of assets.  Warfare commanders are advised to 
ask for “capabilities,” vice asking for specific aircraft support, when making their requests for 
assets to accomplish their assigned missions.  Also, “seeking different variations on how to get 
things done” is a recurrent theme heard in the Tactical Training Group, Pacific training courses.  
Decisions regarding the allocation (and “re-rolling”) of air assets are made by the CESG and his 
staff.  But knowing when to “reach out” beyond ESG to ask higher authority for additional assets 
is also being stressed in the training. 
 
5.  The Road Ahead – Evaluating ESG’s Command and Control Organization 
  
The first activity being undertaken in support of ESG-1 is an evaluation of their currently 
proposed C2 organization.  As a corollary to this activity, we will be able to identify obstacles 
and problems that reduce effectiveness.  A second activity will involve suggestions and 
recommendations for adjustments to the C2 organizations as well as alternative C2 
organizations.  A third, future, activity will involve the design of optimal or congruent 
organizations, i.e., organizations that are best matched to the task and mission requirements. 
 
5.1  Potential Measures of Effectiveness 
 
The A2C2/NPS team is approaching the evaluation of the C2 organization for ESG-1 using a 
combination of attending training meetings to learn concerns, modeling in concert with activities 
at the University of Connecticut, comparisons with findings from other ESG post-deployment 
reports, as well as applying our collective wisdom and experience.  Thus far, we have had 
representation by A2C2/NPS at ESG Commanders Introduction Conference, at the CWC 
Conference, and at the ESG Group Commanders Training.  In addition, we were participants in a 
series of organized meetings with key (past and present) ESG staff where focused question and 
answer sessions added to our knowledge base.  We plan to send observers to subsequent ESG 
exercises and training events as they are scheduled.  Beyond working with ESG-1 directly, we 
have obtained access to various briefs and CNA reports summarizing past ESG deployments; 
several current NPS students have served on past ESGs.   
 
The modeling approach being utilized attempts to expand previous A2C2 methodologies as 
applied successfully in Bridge-to-Global (1999) and in SSG-21 to evaluate alternative C2 
organizations.  Thus far, we are developing the task lists and requirements starting with the 
Mission Essential Task List (METL) for the ESG.  The assets available to the (nominal) ESG are 
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known, along with possible augmentation of additional (Coalition, Navy, Coast Guard) ships 
once in theater.  By combining tasks drawn from the METL into a scenario (with help already 
provided by ESG-N3 personnel) the plan is to examine workload distribution and coordination 
demands across the C2 organizational nodes.   
 
As this work began, it soon became apparent that the key roles of staff and planning activities 
needed to be included in the models.  This is being accomplished by including human “assets” in 
the modeling framework with associated levels of knowledge, skills and abilities for planning, 
supporting and/or conducting operations.  The modeling context is strong on issues of resource 
allocation, but needs expansion with respect to information gathering and information processing 
as prerequisites to task prosecution.  In this regard, the models are now being extended to handle 
intelligence operations, persistent ISR, surveillance and tracking, etc.  Some of the metrics that 
are expected to be forthcoming from these models include: Workload Assessment, 
Communication Bottlenecks, Resource Shortages, and “Speed of Command.” 
 
Among the issues facing an ESG is how it might “plug and play” with (larger) existing forces in 
theater.  Two organizational settings have been proposed as an “end state” for an ESG: 
 
1. As part of a Joint Force, working directly for the Joint Force Commander (e.g., operating 
as theater reserve; or operating as small JTF).  This could be anywhere on a continuum 
from acting as a small JTF with its own AOR to being in a more complex context that 
requires significantly more coordination with JFACC, JFLCC, JFMCC.   
2. As part of a larger Naval Force requiring coordination with its N-staff/CWC structure. 
For example, ESG air agencies and processes (e.g., TACRON, ACE) need to be able to 
work smoothly with JFACC and joint boards, centers and cells in case (1) above.  In case 
(2), the same ESG air agencies and processes need to be able to work smoothly with 
naval CAG/AP/AW. 
 
In either of these settings it is assumed that the mix of tasks/missions assigned to the ESG would 
remain consistent.  But what is affected is the ESG’s C2 organization and processes to enable 
smooth interaction with (1) or (2). We plan to continue our examination of ESG’s C2 
organization as regards its fit with external organizations.  At issue is also the extensibility of the 
ESG, either as a mini-JTF with expansion capabilities (a JTF enabler), or as a (Naval) force 
kernel onto which is added assets in theater, especially coalition forces. 
 
A good deal of consideration has been given to the selection of metrics with which to provide a 
qualitative evaluation of the C2 system (performance and processes).  Metrics take on a lot more 
relevance when two or more alternative C2 organizational structures are compared.  It is often 
more enlightening to understand the relative advantages and disadvantages between two 
candidates (as expressed via comparison of metrics) than to attempt to interpret a set of numbers 
for a single structure on an absolute scale.  One metric that may be enlightening, with our 
acknowledgement to CAPT Randy Morgan, is the number of Operational Orders and FRAG 
orders given per day.  These are obtainable via the order log for Command and Control.  In 
previous ESGs it was observed that the number of orders/day exceeded by about an order of 
magnitude the number of orders typical in a CSG or in an ARG/MEU.  Understanding the 
reasons for this, and the factors that contributed to these increases will shed light on the C2 
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processes in the ESG.  For example, are the factors the wider spectrum of missions faced by the 
ESG, or the fact that a CSG or an ARG/MEU have more limited scope and operate under an 
established C2 doctrine, or the fact that the ESG’s limited assets require a broader set of orders to 
reduce conflicts, or is it a reflection of a C2 organization that is not yet well-matched to the 
mission(s) it faces?  The goal for this A2C2 research is to produce insights to help answer to 
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Introduction
¾ CNO’s Global Concept of Operations requires a restructured Fleet
¾ Switch from today’s 12 CVBGs to:
• 12 Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs), 12 Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs),
multiple Surface Action Groups (SAGs), and guided missile submarines
• Operate independently to counter transnational threats and join 
together to form ESForces — the “gold standard” of naval power 
• Dispersed, netted, and operationally agile fleet, operating as part of the    
Joint Force to conduct a variety of missions
Global Concept of Operations
Designed to increase striking power, enhance flexibility, and provide 
more flexible, robust, and distributed offensive combat capability by 
transforming Amphibious Readiness Group/ Marine Expeditionary 
Unit (Special Operations Capable) ARG/MEUs into ESGs.
What is an Expeditionary Strike Group?
¾ Transform a previously vulnerable, yet highly valuable, asset into a more
combat credible force package: ISR, Strike/NFS, AW, ASW/SW, MIO, TBMD
¾ Combination of three Cruiser-Destroyer ships, a submarine, and a
ARG/MEU(SOC) to form an ESG increases offensive/defensive capabilities
(1) Power projection 
(2) Maritime superiority for air, surface and subsurface 
(3) Maritime special operations 
(4) Amphibious operations 
(5) Military operations other than war 
(6) Enabling operations 
(7) Supporting operations
(8) Serving as a Joint Task Force enabler 
¾ Advantages offered by ESGs include better distribution of global power, 
enhanced combat capability, and improved technologies and efficiencies 
for conducting the GWOT
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¾ ESG can be used to support a combatant commander in larger
contingencies as part of an ESF or it can provide the core capability
to form a Joint Task Force for smaller, operational-level missions. 
¾ Eight core capabilities are provided by ESGs:  Power projection,  
maritime superiority (air, surface, and subsurface), maritime special
operations, amphibious operations, military operations other than 
war, enabling operations, supporting operations, and Joint Task Force
(JTF) enabler. 
Current ESG-1’s mission is to, “provide the Combatant Commander or 
Fleet Commander a versatile sea-based operational force that can be 
tailored to a variety of missions, including quick reaction crisis response
options in maritime, littoral, and inland environs in support of U.S. Policy.
The ESG is capable of executing all ARG/MEU(SOC) missions and 
additional offensive and defensive operations in a limited non-permissive 
environment.” (EWTGPAC, 2005)
Integrated Mission Essential Tasks Conducted 
by an Expeditionary Strike Group
Both USN and USMC 
 
 Conduct Intelligence, Surveillance and  
 Reconnaissance 
 Conduct Amphibious Assault 
 Conduct Information Operations/ Warfare  Conduct Amphibious Withdrawal 
 Tactical Deception Operations  Conduct Amphibious Demonstration 
 Provide Operational Fires (Joint/ Coalition)  Conduct NEO 
 Provide Anti-Terrorism/ Force Protection  Conduct Humanitarian/ Disaster Assist 
 Conduct Terminal Guidance Operations  Conduct Peace Operations 
 Conduct MIO/ EMIO Operations  Conduct Deliberate Planning 
 Conduct ESG Force Defense  
 (AD/USW/SUW/DAF) 
 Provide Contingency Support Packages (TRAP,
 CASEVAC, QRF, MASS, CASUALTY)  
 Conduct VBSS (compliant/ non-compliant)  USMC Specific 
    
 Conduct Sustainment Operations  Conduct Amphibious Raid 
 Provide Command, Control, Communications  
 and Computers 
 Conduct Direct Action Operations  
 (Precision  Raid or VBSS) 
 Conduct Initial Terminal Guidance Operations  Conduct Airfield/ Port Seizure 
 
USN Specific 
   
 Conduct Security Operations 
 Provide Theatre Missile Defense Warning  Conduct Limited Expeditionary Airfield OpÕs 
 Provide Sea Lines of Communications Protection  Employ Non-Lethal Weapons 
 Provide Sanctions Enforcement  Conduct Enhanced Urban Operations 









  Amphibious  Assault 
  Amphibious  Raid 
  Amphibious  Demonstration  
  Amphibious  Withdrawal 
 
Direct Action Operations 
 
  Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities  
  Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Operations (VBSS) 
  Specialized Demolition  Operations 
  Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel  (TRAP) 
  Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel or Material 
  Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destructi on 
 
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) 
 
  Peace Operations 
           -  Peacekeeping 
           -  Peace Enforcement 
  Security Operations 
  Noncombatant Evacuation Ope rations (NEO) 
  Reinforcement Operations 
  Joint/Combined  Training/  Instruction  Team 




  Tactical Deception Ope rations 
  Fire Support  Planning , Coordination  and Control in a Joint/  Combined Environment  
  Signal Intelligence/ Electroni c Warfare 
  Military Ope rations in Urban Terrain 
  Reconnaissan ce and Surveillance 
  Initial Terminal Guidan ce 
  Counterintelligence Ope rations  
  Airfield/ Port Seizure  
  Limited Expeditionary Airfield Op erations 
  Show of Force Operations 
  Joint Task Force Enabling Ope rations 
  Shipping Operations 
 
“Plug and Play”
¾ ESG-1 must be able to work smoothly while planning and conducting these 
missions in several contexts
¾ Two issues are of particular interest to this study  
1)  ESG-1 as a “unit of force” under a senior Naval Commander such as a 
Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), Fleet 
commander, or Amphibious Force Commander requiring coordination 
with N-staff/CWC Doctrine and possibly Joint Amphibious Doctrine. 
2)  As part of a Joint Force, working directly for the Joint Force CDR 
• Range from a small JTF with its own AOR to a context that requires 
sig’ly more coordination w/ the JFACC, JFLCC, JFMCC, and JSOTF
• In this case Joint Doctrine is applicable, including Joint Amphibious 
Doctrine
• C2 agencies with which the ESG will need to interoperate, and their 
underlying doctrine will change. For example, coalition ships may 
join the ESG for various missions.
¾ Dispersed Ops and Attachments raises question whether a CWC org is best 
• CWC requires close proximity of all warfare commanders for planning, 
asset apportionment, and task execution. ESG-1 can anticipate 
detaching assets to support other commanders and assuming control of 
additional assets from coalition partners, Coast Guard, Navy, etc.
Adaptive Architectures 
for Command and Control (A2C2)
¾ Early research - Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Strategic Studies Group 
(SSG) XVIII to help define adaptive command structures for what will
become Sea Power XXI. 
¾ Commander Carrier Group One (COMCARGRUONE), ADM Polatty’s staff, 
to conduct a one-week experiment with model-driven alternative command 
structures in preparation for Global Wargame 1999.
¾ 2001, conducted a series of quantitative modeling and simulation analyses 
to support the SSG XXI Cognitive Concept Generation Team. Goal was to
align Navy’s tactical C2 organization/ processes w/ the FORCEnet concept.  
Results:  Superiority of FORCEnet structures over CWC structures for  
future missions.  Modeling and simulation results indicate that the  
FORCEnet C2 organizational structure has potential to increase speed of 
command (over today’s CWC structure) through more efficient use of 
resources, and, through increased collaboration, to improve the 
warfighter’s shared awareness of the situation and of the roles, 
responsibilities, and actions of other warfighters.
9 FORCEnet structure will be more adaptable, thus better able to 
maintain performance as the situation and/or mission changes.
ESG-1/ A2C2 Research Objectives
¾ Model current organizational architecture and C2 processes of ESG-1
and identify possible deficiencies and performance problems that are due 
to structural, organizational and behavioral causes
¾ Three levels of analysis could be performed include: assessment, 
comparison, and optimization analysis of the current ESG structure with a 
scenario across a range of measures of performance. 
• Assessment:  Diagnosis of problematic areas and suggestions for
potential organizational remedies
• Comparison:  Comparative modeling of current structure vs. alternative 
structures (alternative operational architectures) and a quantitative
assessment of performance pay-offs
• Optimization: Quantitative assessment of performance pay-offs of an  
optimization-based design and simulation of alternative architectures
ESG Research Issues
¾ Can the ESG-1 make the most efficient and effective use of its assets to
address the varying mix of missions across these two organizational
contexts while using a CWC (or current?) structure?  [Note: The C2 
architecture includes ESG staff structure and doctrine, ESG organization 
structure/ doctrine, and ESG C2 processes.] 
¾ Related questions include --
What are the structural and process inhibitors of efficient/ effective:
• Use of assets? 
• Coordination with MEU and use of MEU assets? 
• Use of  externals (e.g., coalition, attached units, reach back, and
requests/ planning)? 
• Asset allocation process? 
ESG Research Issues (cont’d)
¾ Flag Officer/General Officer
• Traditional ARG/MEU(SOC) deploys with two, co-equal 06 CDRs, CO of 
the MEU(SOC) and CO of the amphibious squadron
• Supported/supporting doctrine in Joint Doctrine for Amphib Ops
 Higher authority may designate, or CPR and CO MEU will mutually 
agree upon the supported commander
 Command model adopted by ESG-2
• ESG-1 operated under a flag officer:  Separate staff, and the CDR, 
ESG-1 functioned as the officer in tactical command (OTC) 
• Advantages of Flag-led ESG: 
 Provides Coalition Force Maritime Component Commander a more 
experienced and senior Staff afloat
 Bridges the operational and tactical levels and avoids task 
saturation at the CTG level
 More effective when coordinating with Flag-led coalition Units 
 Achieves parity with a Carrier Strike Group — signif advantage 
once in theater and for procuring resources during work ups
 Essential for conducting Regional Engagements, particularly in 
the CENTCOM area of operations
Doctrine
¾ ESG currently uses a mixture of doctrines, combining Composite Warfare 
Commander (CWC) doctrine and the supported/supporting relationship from 
Amphibious doctrine.
• Surface Combat Commander (SCC) required to operate under two different 
sets of doctrine  
• SCC node can become extremely busy and requirement for the OTC to 
manage two org’l structures adds to an already high workload 
¾ Under CWC doctrine the SCC has authority for the apportionment of assets
• When managing MEU assets, supported/supporting relationship is the 
prevailing doctrine and represents very different way of apportioning assets 
¾ Issues that arise when employing a combined set of doctrine 
• Who is the supported commander and who is the supporting for different 
situations? 
¾ CWC doctrine is geared more for open ocean operations; Strike capability was 
added later where the Navy version of strike was conducted by carrier aircraft.  
Because Naval strike and amphibious strike involve different aspects, it can be 

































Proposed Command and Control Structure for ESG-1
The CWC-like Relationships in ESG-1
¾ Expertise, staff size and capability, conflict resolution authority need be
taken into account
• Role of Strike Commander may not be allocated to the MEU CDR, but  
is retained by CESG-1
• Advantages include the ability to better coordinate Navy strike with 
MEU ground strike (providing unity of command), keeping a focal 
point for resolving competing demands from other WCs for ACE air 
assets, and removing/reducing oper’l constraints on MEU assets
• Controversial as the battalion landing team is major strike force in ESG, 
and primary mission for ACE is to support Marines on the ground. 
• Previous ESG deployments, upon entering theater and becoming a unit 
of force under a JTF or a FLT CDR, Marines were often detached ashore
(sometimes with only a part of their ACE), or part of the ACE (e.g., the
AV8Bs) were sent off (i.e., tactical control (TACON) was transferred) to  
regional commander for assignment elsewhere.  It is felt that the
flexibility to deal with such external demands on MEU strike assets is 
best left to the CESG and his N-staff.
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